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Choosing to be changed: Revelation, identity and the ethics of self-
transformation 
 
Abstract 
 
How one should decide whether to undergo an experience that changes who one is? In her 
discussion of “transformative experiences”, L. A. Paul argues that, to choose rationally when 
deliberating first-personally, one should base one’s decision on “revelation”, i.e. to discover 
out what the experience will be like. If this solution is taken as the sole means by which a 
transformative choice is made, then I argue it is problematic. This is because (i) it overlooks 
the role that one’s practical identity ought to play when making a major life-decision; and (ii) 
it ignores morally-relevant reasons for action. Even if we retain the revelation approach as 
only part of the means through which a transformative choice is made, I argue that revelation 
should frequently carry little weight in our decision-making. Rather than focusing on the 
subjective quality of future experiences, it is often preferable to reflect on who one is and 
what one’s endorsed practical identity commits one to. 
 
Key words: Identity; L. A. Paul; Rational choice; Revelation; Self-transformation; 
Transformative experiences 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How should one make a decision that will change who one is? This is a question that each of 
us will confront on numerous occasions, whether deliberating about having a child, moving 
to a new country or changing one’s career. Laurie Paul’s recent discussion of “transformative 
experiences” addresses precisely this issue (Paul, 2014, 2015a). Owing to the transformative 
nature of significant life-choices, Paul argues that one cannot make them using the standard 
normative model of rational deliberation, which is the method that we ‘naturally and 
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intuitively’ want to employ in everyday life (Paul, 2015b, p. 761). This model involves 
assigning a subjective value to each possible outcome by imagining what it will be like to 
experience them and selecting the one with the highest value (i.e. the best expected subjective 
experiential value). This value must be assigned by the agent him/herself, as it is derived 
from their experience itself, rather than from features of the world. The problem is that, when 
considering a transformative experience (hereafter “TE”), one cannot know what the 
experience will be like and how it will change one’s preferences. Consequently, one cannot 
assign the necessary subjective values to the possible outcomes in order to choose between 
them. Instead, Paul argues that, to choose rationally, one must decide to undergo a TE for the 
sake of “revelation”; that is, on the basis of wanting to discover what the experience will be 
like. 
 
Some theorists have denied that there is a problem here. They claim that the standard model 
of rational choice can easily accommodate deliberation about uncertain, or even unknowable, 
outcomes (Dougherty et al., 2015; Pettigrew, 2015). Others have argued that I can have 
sufficient knowledge of what it will be like for me to have a TE, for example by relying on 
the testimony of others (Harman, 2015) or because of the relationship between the 
phenomenal character of an experience and epistemically available facts about its non-
phenomenal character (Sharadin, 2015). Unlike these theorists, I think that Paul identifies a 
genuine problem. However, I suggest that Paul’s solution – to choose on the basis of 
revelation – is incomplete and potentially morally problematic. It is incomplete because it 
makes no reference to the role that one’s practical identity does and should play in rational 
deliberation about TEs. It would be morally problematic if it is treated as the sole, or even 
main, basis upon which many transformative decisions are made. This is because such 
choices frequently involve important ethical considerations, which the revelation solution, on 
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its own, cannot incorporate. This is especially the case with transformative choices that 
directly affect other people. 
 
As a necessary addition to Paul’s revelation argument, I present an account of rational 
deliberation about TEs that focuses on one’s practical identity and the reasons for action that 
it provides. Crucially, such deliberation does not depend on imagining what it will be like to 
have the experience. Rather, it involves acting in a way that is reflective of who one is, i.e. 
one’s reflectively-endorsed values, preferences, commitments and social roles. This allows 
one to act with integrity, and ensures that one’s decision is justified, regardless of how one is 
changed by the experience itself. Importantly, this practical identity account fits well with the 
ethical dimension of much decision-making. One’s reasons for choosing a TE should often be 
acceptable to other people, specifically, those people directly affected by it. Basing a decision 
on reasons grounded in one’s identity will often enable one to justify one’s decision to these 
people in a way that the revelation solution cannot. 
 
Thus, my discussion is not offered as a refutation of, alternative to, Paul’s account. Rather, it 
as a necessary enrichment of it. I show that our decision-making about TEs should not be 
made solely or primarily by determining how strongly we value revelatory experiences or, 
more generally, by imagining the subjective experiential value of an outcome. It should also 
include reference to the kind of person one is and wants to be. I also highlight the ethical 
nature of many, perhaps most, of the transformative choices we make. There is thus no one 
single solution to the problem of transformative choices. Rather, an adequate solution must 
acknowledge the plurality of reasons that are relevant to one’s decision, including the role of 
one’s practical identity and the moral nature of one’s decisions. The result is a more complex 
picture of decision-making, but one that is more normatively appealing, and perhaps more 
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reflective of how many of us do deliberate, than that offered by much of the current 
discussion about TEs. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I define what a TE is and the challenge that it 
poses to the standard normative model of rational decision-making. In section 3, I outline 
Paul’s solution to this problem. In section 4, I show that this solution is incomplete and 
outline a necessary enrichment of it, which focuses on how one’s practical identity can guide 
one’s decision-making when faced with a TE. In section 5, I demonstrate why Paul’s 
solution, if taken as the sole means of deciding what to do, can be ethically unacceptable and 
how to avoid this problem. Thus, my overall aim is to improve our understanding of how one 
can choose to be changed in a rationally and ethically acceptable manner. 
 
 
2. Paul’s challenge 
 
At various times in one’s life one must make a decision that has significant ramifications for 
who one is and the kind of life one leads. Such decisions can change one’s values and 
preferences, sometimes quite profoundly and unexpectedly. In her recent work, Paul explores 
how one can rationally make these decisions through the concept of a “transformative 
experience” (Paul, 2015a, 2014).1 A TE can be transformative in two ways: epistemically and 
personally. An epistemically TE involves having ‘a new and different kind of experience, a 
kind of experience that teaches [a person] something she could not have learned without 
having that kind of experience’ (Paul, 2014, p. 10).2 It involves experiencing for the first time 
                                                 
1  Paul acknowledges the influence of Ullmann-Margalit's work on her thinking about this issue. See Ullmann-
Margalit (2007, 2006). 
2  Here Paul draws on Jackson (1982). 
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what something is like from the subjective, first-person point of view (i.e. what something is 
like for me). For example, a teenager may have their first sexual encounter or a blind person 
might see for the first time. A personally TE is one that ‘can change your point of view, and 
by extension, your personal preferences, and perhaps even the kind of person that you are or 
at least take yourself to be’ (Paul, 2014, p. 16). 
 
Paul is interested in those experiences that are both epistemically and personally 
transformative. Having such an experience ‘teaches you something new, something that you 
could not have known before the experience, while also changing you as a person’ (Paul, 
2014, p. 17). She discusses several examples, including becoming a vampire (Paul, 2014, pp. 
43–50), giving one’s deaf child a cochlear implant (Paul, 2014, pp. 56–70), having a child 
(Paul, 2014, pp. 71–94, 2015a) and changing one’s career (Paul, 2014, pp. 98–103). Paul is 
concerned with how one can make these decisions in a rational manner.3 She argues that they 
cannot be made within the terms of the standard account of normative decision-making. This 
is because it describes a decision procedure in which one imagines a variety of possible 
options and selects the “best” one, defined as that which has the highest expected subjective 
experiential value (Paul, 2014, p. 21). That is, ‘You simulate the relevant possible outcomes 
for yourself... you simulate what it would be like for you to have each of these experiences 
and what your life would be like after these experiences’ (Paul, 2014, p. 26). 
 
According to Paul, the problem that TEs pose for this model of deliberation is that you cannot 
know what value such experiences will have for you. Because they are epistemically novel, 
you cannot know what it is like to undergo the experience until you have had it. This thwarts 
                                                 
3  Typically, TEs will be significant life-choices that have a strong impact upon a central feature of one’s life. 
Thus, I will treat “TEs” and “significant life-choices” as depicting roughly the same group of decisions and 
experience. 
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‘our ability to rationally assign subjective values to radically new outcomes’ (Paul, 2014, p. 
47). Because they are personally transformative, you cannot know how you will feel about 
the decision. This is because your preferences, desires and values will be altered by the 
experience itself. Knowledge of how you will be changed is epistemically closed off from 
pre-choice self (Paul, 2014, pp. 47–8). Consequently, the decision to have a TE contains a 
basic, inescapable ignorance: ‘ignorance about what it will be like to undergo the experience 
and ignorance about how the experience will change you’ (Paul, 2014, p. 32).4 
 
The upshot of this is that the choice to undergo a TE cannot be made using the standard 
normative model of decision-making, for no subjective values can be assigned to the possible 
outcomes that one is to select between. For example, when it comes to having a child one 
cannot know what this experience will be like and how it will affect one’s preferences, values 
and the like. Consequently, ‘if you want to make the choice rationally, you cannot use the 
ordinary, culturally sanctioned, subjectively based approach to having a child, the approach 
where you deliberate about whether to have a child by envisioning what the outcomes 
involving your lived experience as a parent would be like’ (Paul, 2014, p. 83). 
 
 
3. Paul’s solution: Choosing revelation 
 
Paul’s solution is to keep the standard model of decision-making as it is and to understand 
transformative choices as involving the decision to have a “revelatory” experience (Paul, 
2014, p. 113ff.). She argues that, although one cannot assign a subjective value to the 
experience prior to having it, one can know beforehand whether one values having new and 
                                                 
4  Paul’s problem echoes Kierkegaard’s observation that life can only be understood backwards, but must be 
lived forwards. We only know what we need to know when it is too late (Kierkegaard, 2000, p. 12).  
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transformative, i.e. revelatory, experiences. Accordingly, one can rationally choose to 
undergo the experience on this basis, irrespective of the actual experiential nature of the event 
in question: 
 
[T]o choose rationally, you must prefer to discover whether and how your 
preferences will change. If you choose to avoid the transformative experience, to 
choose rationally, you must prefer not to discover whether your preferences will 
change. The idea is that if you choose revelation, you choose it for its own sake 
(Paul, 2014, p. 118). 
 
To return to one of Paul’s favoured examples, you cannot know how you will be changed by 
becoming a parent and you cannot know what it will be like for you to be one. Thus, you 
cannot know what future preferences you will have and whether being a parent will satisfy 
them. Therefore, to choose to have a child in a rationally acceptable manner, ‘you don’t 
choose it because you know what it will be like – you choose it in order to discover who 
you’ll become’ (Paul, 2014, p. 119). In other words, ‘you choose the experience for the sake 
of discovery itself’ (Paul, 2014, p. 120). 
 
Let us consider another example. Julia is a doctor. She is deciding whether to volunteer with 
an aid agency to work in a hospital in a war-torn part of Syria. Until now, she has lived and 
worked in a small, English town. Paul’s account of the standard model of rational 
deliberation holds that Julia should make her decision by first considering the options 
available to her – “working in Syria” and “not working in Syria” – and then determining 
which outcome will have the greatest subjective utility value, based upon what she imagines 
it will be like for her to experience each outcome. The problem is that, prior to making the 
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decision, Julia – given her life-experience up until now – cannot know (a) what the 
experience of working in Syria will be like and (b) how the experience will alter her 
preferences and values. Consequently, she cannot assign an expected value to the “working in 
Syria” option. However, she does know whether she values having “revelatory” experiences; 
she knows whether she values having new experiences and discovering how she is changed 
by them. If she does value revelation, then it would be rational to choose to work in Syria, 
regardless of its experiential quality. 
 
It is important to note that Paul is considering a particular form of practical rationality, which 
involves envisioning possible futures and deciding which one you prefer to bring about. She 
is addressing subjective deliberation made from one’s first-personal point of view (Paul, 
2014, p. 24). Thus, she allows that there are other rational ways of deciding how to act. For 
example, as Barnes notes, it would be rational to decide to have a child if one is the queen 
and an heir to the throne is needed (Barnes, 2015, p. 778). One is here responding to 
impersonal reasons to have a child, which do not arise from one’s first-personal perspective 
on the situation.5 Paul’s argument is that, when one is deliberating about what to do from 
one’s first-personal perspective – when asking oneself, “what do I want to do” – the rational 
way of doing this with regard to a TE is by choosing on the basis of revelation. 
 
To clarify the discussion, it is useful to distinguish between two possible versions of Paul’s 
argument. The strong version states that the only way that one can rationally decide to 
undergo it is on the basis of revelation. The weak version says that, if one wants to base one’s 
decision on subjective valuations of future experiences, then one can only refer to the value 
of revelation itself, rather than what the experience itself will be like for you. Experiential 
                                                 
5 Of course, one must still decide, from one’s perspective, whether to do what is required of one as queen. The 
point is that the reasons themselves are independent of one’s first-person perspective. 
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value can form part of one’s deliberative process, but it is set alongside other relevant 
methods of choice.6 
 
We can imagine someone who is uncertain whether to undergo a TE. She reads Paul’s work 
in the hope of finding some guidance. She may either (i) adopt the strong version and decide 
to base her decision solely on the value that revelation has for her; or (ii) adopt the weak 
version and invoke the value of revelation only if she wants to consider the experiential value 
of the possible outcomes. Thus, she will then have to settle the question of what reasons to be 
guided by in making her decision. As noted, Paul allows that we can base a decision on a 
variety of reasons, including non-first-personal ones. Thus, she endorses the weak version of 
her argument. Nevertheless, she also emphasises repeatedly the importance of making a 
decision based on imagining what the outcomes will be like, that is, their experiential value. 
For example:  
 
On my view, for many big, life-changing decisions, you want to authentically 
assess your options by assessing the subjective value of your possible future lived 
experiences. Ideally, the assessment involves a determination of the subjective 
value of each possible outcome of your decision, that is, each possible lived 
experience, by imaginatively grasping what it would be like for you to live in that 
future (Paul, 2015c, p. 807). 
 
In the case where you have a child, the relevant outcomes are phenomenal 
outcomes concerning what it is like for you to have your child, including what it is 
like to have the beliefs, desires, emotions and dispositions that result, directly and 
indirectly, from having your own child. Thus, the relevant values are determined 
by what it is like for you to have your child (Paul, 2015a, p. 153). 
 
                                                 
6 I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewers for clarifying my thinking on this issue. 
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Consequently, upon reading Paul’s work, one may find oneself either pushed toward the 
strong version, or pushed toward accepting the weak version but placing great emphasis on 
subjective experiential value (and hence revelation). In the next section, I argue that the 
strong version is mistaken because it overlooks important ways in which we can, and often 
should, decide to undergo a TE that do involve the idea of revelation. I suggest that the weak 
version is defensible, but we must be careful how much weight we give to the value of 
revelation in relation to other relevant practical reasons. Often, I argue, it will be 
inappropriate to give much, if any, consideration to future experiential value when deciding 
what to do. In these cases, the revelation solution should play little or no role in our 
deliberative process. For example, deciding to have a child should primarily involve 
reflection on what one currently values, the kind of person one wants to be and one’s existing 
commitments, rather than a focus on what the experience of having a child will be like and 
how it will change who one is. Thus, although Paul is right to endorse the weak version of her 
argument, I still worry that she places too much emphasis on the importance of future 
experiences when making significant life choices. If we are to solve the problem of TEs, then 
we need a richer, more complex account of rational decision-making than Paul’s discussion 
provides. I argue that reflecting on one’s practical identity and how it can guide one’s 
decisions will help to provide this account. 
 
 
4. Rational choice and practical identity 
 
That an outcome will have the highest experiential value compared to other possible 
outcomes can certainly be a good reason for choosing it. Consider, for example, deciding to 
drink lemonade instead of coffee. However, this is not the only way that one can or should 
think about decision-making when deliberating in a first-personal manner. One’s practical 
identity – composed of one’s values, preferences, social roles, commitments and the like – 
provides significant normative resources for rational deliberation and justification. This 
applies to cases that involve radical uncertainty about what the outcomes will be like and how 
they will affect who one is. Importantly, one need not consider how one’s practical identity 
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relates to expected experiential outcomes when deliberating in this way. Rather, one’s 
practical identity normatively orients one in the world and provides one with reasons for 
action, regardless of what it is like to experience the consequences of one’s choices. 
 
This account rests upon the fact that a person’s practical identity is inherently action-guiding. 
For example, social groups and identities – e.g. being “gay”, “female” and/or “African-
American” – have normative expectations (social scripts) built into them that legislate 
appropriate forms of behaviour for that identity. In Appiah’s words, they contain ‘modes of 
behaviour’; they ‘provide loose norms or models, which play a role in shaping the ground 
projects of those for whom these collective identities are central to their individual identities’ 
(Appiah, 2005, p. 108). Insofar as one identifies with the identity in question, then one has 
reasons to act in certain ways, and hence to make certain choices, consistent with the 
demands of that identity. One’s choices need not be determined by the content of one’s social 
identity, but one should be sensitive to its demands if one identifies with it. In addition, 
reasons for action can also be derived from one’s social roles, values and commitments, as 
well as the obligations that arise from them (again, assuming that one identifies with or 
endorses these roles, values and commitments). These reasons for action consist in what it is 
normatively appropriate for a person who has the value, relationship, role or social / 
collective identity in question to do.7  
 
To illustrate this, consider again Julia’s decision to volunteer for aid work in Syria. Let us 
assume that she cannot know what the experience will be like and how she will be changed 
                                                 
7  The normative content of values, relationships and roles is socio-culturally relative. Thus, what it means to 
be, say, a good parent will differ across various geographical and temporal contexts. Furthermore, there is 
always a certain amount of leeway in terms of how a role or identity is interpreted (social norms are always 
open to interpretation). Thus, one can inhabit a role or an identity in various ways. However, this must stay 
within limits to be recognisable as that role or identity. 
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by it. Nevertheless, she does know that she values being a doctor and that it is important to 
her to help people in need. To value something is, at least in part, to see that thing as valuable 
and hence to want to act in appropriate ways toward the thing of value (Scheffler, 2004). 
Thus, to value friendship is to take oneself as having reasons to act in ways that are 
supportive of / required by the concept itself. Someone who claims to value friendship, but 
who never responds to his friends’ requests for help, is either deeply mistaken about the 
meaning of “friendship” or lying to himself and/or others. Thus, to value X is not just to 
derive pleasure from X, but also to be committed to acting, and to want to act, in appropriate 
ways in relation to X. To quote Scanlon, ‘A person who values friendship will take herself to 
have reasons, first and foremost, to do those things that are involved in being a good friend: 
to be loyal, to be concerned with her friend’s interests, to try to stay in touch, to spend time 
with her friends, and so on’ (Scanlon, 1998, p. 88). 
 
Importantly, meeting the normative requirements that valuing imposes on us does not involve 
consideration of what it will be like, experientially, for us to do so. For example, assume that 
I value friendship. Being a good friend will require me to forego watching a football match 
on television because my friend’s mother has died and she needs some company. To decide 
between the alternatives – “watch the football game” and “comfort my friend” – I do not 
‘project forward and evaluate different possible acts and their outcomes’, as Paul 
recommends we deliberate when deciding what to do (Paul, 2014, p. 26). Rather, I choose to 
stay with my friend because that is what it means to be a good friend. I need not make this 
choice – I could decide to have the more pleasurable experience of watching football – but so 
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long as I want to be a good friend and identify myself as such, then I have strong reasons to 
decide to comfort my friend.8 
 
Returning to Julia, we can see that, if she values being a doctor and helping people in need, 
then she has good reason to go to Syria, regardless of what it will be like to work in Syria. 
Her identification with being a doctor provides normative guidance and justification for her 
choice. This is disconnected from the subjective experiential value of the possible outcomes 
she is faced with. Importantly, her deliberation is still conducted from the first-personal 
perspective. She does not invoke objective moral requirements or political imperatives. She is 
considering her agent-relative reasons that arise because of what she cares about. She is also 
considering possible outcomes to choose between. Thus, thus envisions what the future might 
be like, but she does not invoke its experiential quality in assigning value to the outcomes. An 
outcome’s worth derives from its connection with what she values and the type of person she 
wants to be, rather than what it will be like to experience. 
 
Indeed, if Julia is wholeheartedly committed to being a doctor and to helping people in need, 
then she may not stop to calculate what she ought to do. Rather, perhaps after seeing 
television footage of the immense suffering being experienced by the people of Syria, she 
simply begins to make travel arrangements. This could represent a “volitional necessity”, in 
which one is compelled to act in a certain way because of what one cares about / values. To 
quote Frankfurt: ‘There are occasions when a person realizes that what he cares about matters 
to him not merely so much, but in such a way, that it is impossible for him to forebear from a 
certain course of action’ (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 86). 
                                                 
8  Indeed, to calculate whether I should comfort my friend or watch football could be, as Williams put it, to 
have ‘one thought too many’ (Williams, 1981, p. 18). 
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Frankfurt gives the example of Luther’s declaration that, “Here I stand; I can do no other”. 
His being unable to act otherwise does not derive from some external force, but rather from 
Luther’s internal value system. Because of his commitments and beliefs, ‘every apparent 
alternative to that course is unthinkable’ (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 86). One’s practical identity can 
take courses of action off the deliberative table, as it were, because of the strength of what 
one cares about: ‘To the extent that a person is constrained by volitional necessities, there are 
certain things that he cannot help willing or that he cannot bring himself to do’ (Frankfurt, 
1999, p. 114). The relevant point is that the decision to pursue a course of action, even if it is 
likely to be transformative, can be based on who one is now, rather than on what the future 
experience will be like.9 Luther need not contemplate the consequences of his action to be 
sure that he must decide as he does; what it will be like to experience the consequences is 
irrelevant to him, even when deliberating from his first-personal perspective. 
 
We can see how one’s practical identity can be the basis for choosing to have a child. When 
making this decision, I can reflect on what reasons my endorsed practical identity provides 
me with (e.g. what I value in life, the kind of person I am and the commitments that I have). 
Do I value organising my days as I see fit, spending a lot of time on my own, regularly 
travelling to other countries, sleeping in until lunchtime at the weekends and/or dedicating 
myself to my career? If so, then these values provide me with reasons against becoming a 
parent. Conversely, do I value family life, doing nice things for other people, caring for them 
and/or spending time in the company of others? If so, then these values provide me with 
reasons in favour of becoming a parent. Such considerations about what I value in life and the 
                                                 
9  Along similar lines, Kaupinnen (2015) argues that one ought to make life choices in a “story-regarding” 
rather than an “experience-regarding” manner; that is, on the basis of how one’s choices fit into a wider life 
narrative about who one is, rather than what one’s future experiences will be like.  
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features of my personality that I endorse do much of the necessary justificatory work when 
deciding to have a child. They render my decision a rational one, even though I cannot know 
how I will be changed by having a child and what its subjective experiential value will be. To 
quote Chang: 
 
What matters in such a choice is not getting the objectively and subjectively best 
experience. Having a good experience is relevant to the choice, but the choice 
about whether to have a child is primarily one about whether to bring a being into 
your life and into the world, not about what you are to experience (Chang, 2015, 
p. 261). 
 
It may be objected that my remarks misunderstand Paul’s argument and the challenge it poses 
for first-personal rational deliberation. Paul acknowledges that some people like caring for 
others, whilst other people have never had an interest in parenthood, which provides reasons 
for and against procreating respectively. Part of the problem she identifies is that TEs can 
change one’s values and preferences. For example, the person who has always valued playing 
with and looking after other people’s children may find that they do not value having their 
own child. Accordingly, one cannot use one’s current practical identity as a guide to deciding 
between possible outcomes involving TEs, because one’s identity can be changed through the 
experience itself. Thus, I cannot know which decision will best satisfy what I value or care 
about most, because I cannot know what my post-TE values and preferences will be. This 
may undermine the practical identity account as a solution to Paul’s challenge. 
 
In response, one can ask why it should matter to me, when deliberating about a choice I am 
making now, that my values and preferences may change later in ways that I can neither 
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control nor predict (at least with any degree of certainty). It matters for Paul because she 
construes such deliberation in terms of imagining what it will be like to have the experience 
and the value this experience will have for me, which can only be determined by ascribing 
values and preferences to my future self. However, it will not matter to someone who is 
unconcerned, or even only relatively unconcerned, with what the experiential nature of an 
outcome will be. This person will want to ensure that their decision reflects their current 
values and preferences, irrespective of what future values and preferences they may have. 
What matters to them will be the realisation of their values through their actions. 
 
This does not mean that the person is dismissive of, or entirely inattentive to, the future and 
how their decisions will affect them. On the contrary, we have projects, hopes, wishes and 
plans that are necessarily future-oriented. We seek to realise our values through pursuing 
these projects and plans. We make decisions, such as to study philosophy or to apply for law 
school, that shape who we are and, hopefully, result in our being a certain kind of person in 
the future (a philosophy teacher; a judge). However, what matters is who we are now – which 
includes our plans and preferences for who we will be in the future –  and how the future 
relates to our current sense of self. We need not invoke a possible, altered future self that will 
experience and evaluative these experiences in ways quite different to who we are and who 
we want to be (assuming, again, that we can neither know nor control whether such a self will 
come into existence). Rather, we need only invoke a future self that extends out from – a 
future self that is the realisation of – our current self.10 
                                                 
10  We may still think it desirable if agents are flexible in terms of responding to unforeseen and unchosen 
alterations in their identity. I might deeply want to become a doctor and play my life accordingly, but 
discover (much to my and other people’s surprise) that I find life as a doctor wholly unrewarding and 
unenjoyable. Alternatively, perhaps I did enjoy being a doctor but am now entirely alienated from such a 
life. It would then be appropriate to revise my sense of self and my future plans in response to these changes 
in self. 
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The reason that many people care about acting with integrity is because they want to act in 
ways that are consistent with who they are, regardless of an outcome’s experiential value and 
effect on the self (see McFall, 1987). As Taylor writes, ‘I have integrity to the degree to 
which my actions and statements are true expressions of what is really of importance to me. It 
is their intrinsic character as revelations or expressions that count, not their consequences’ 
(Taylor, 1982, p. 144; emphasis added). One can act with integrity by ensuring one’s 
behaviour is in accordance with one’s endorsed practical identity. If one really does value 
something, or is genuinely committed to a cause or a social role, then one should act in ways 
required by that value, commitment or role, rather than focusing primarily on (and being 
swayed by) what the experiential consequences of their action will be.11 Indeed, worrying too 
much about a decision’s experiential value, or how one will be changed by it, may even 
detract from or threaten one’s integrity, if this is construed as indicating a lack of 
commitment to one’s values, projects or commitments. 
 
Thus far, I have sought to show that one’s endorsed practical identity provides the normative 
resources to make a transformative choice in a rational manner, even when one is deliberating 
first-personally and asking oneself, “What do I want to do?”. Insofar as one identifies with 
elements of one’s practical identity, then it provides reasons for action that can determine 
what one should do, regardless of the consequences or future experiential value of the 
decision. If this is right, then it challenges the strong version of Paul’s solution. Choosing for 
the sake of revelation is not the only way that one can or should choose to undergo a TE, 
even when deliberating first-personally. This means that the weak version must be endorsed. 
                                                 
11  For example, an activist may choose to go on hunger strike because they think it is the best means to further 
their political cause, to which they are deeply committed, even though the decision will be experientially 
unpleasant and hence of low / negative experiential value. 
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The weak version states that, when faced with a TE, if I want to make the decision based 
upon its experiential value, then I cannot do this by imagining what the experience of the 
outcome will be like and must instead choose on the basis of revelation. On the weak version, 
the revelation account is compatible with the practical identity account because they concern 
different methods of deliberation. Thus, my argument does not refute the weak version. 
Rather, it shows that a full solution to the problem of TEs must include both the role of one’s 
practical identity and Paul’s revelation account.  
 
Consider, for example, someone who is thinking of becoming a soldier because she is 
interested in experiencing what a real battle is like. She wants to know what it will be like for 
her to experience fighting at close quarters. She is not realising some deeply-held value, 
project or commitment, such as a strong sense of patriotism or a familial tradition of serving 
in the armed forces. She simply has a strong desire to know first-personally what war is like. 
I will assume, for the sake of argument, that serving as a soldier and fighting in a war is likely 
to be personally transformative. This means that Paul’s challenge applies: the person cannot 
know beforehand what it will be like to experience being in combat and how it will affect her 
preferences, and so she cannot assign it a subjective experiential value. Furthermore, she 
cannot look to her practical identity for guidance because all she is interested in is the 
experience itself and whether it is worth it. In this case, Paul’s revelation method can be 
employed. The person can choose on the basis of having the experience itself. 
 
Accepting the weak version leaves us with the challenge of choosing between these 
competing methods and the reasons for action they generate. There may be significant 
disagreement or uncertainty about what transformative decisions are, and should be, made for 
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the sake of revelation and what decisions are best made by reflecting on one’s practical 
identity. For example, if someone wanted to become a solider or a doctor simply to find out 
what this life would be like, we might think that their decision-making lacked, for want of a 
better word, “depth”. Career choices are a central feature of one’s life-plans and projects, 
which both reflect and shape who one is and the life that one leads. Thus, we may well expect 
a person to choose their career based on their core values and preferences, rather than simply 
for the sake of finding out what such a life will be like for them to experience.12  
 
Of course, the two methods are not mutually exclusive. Instead of choosing between them, I 
may instead weigh up the reasons for action that both revelation and my practical identity 
provide. Many of us make decisions by invoking and weighing up different relevant reasons, 
especially with regard to significant life choices. However, there remains the difficulty of 
determining how much weight to assign to revelation-reasons and to practical identity-
reasons respectively, especially if they suggest different courses of action. If we think that 
choosing to become a doctor or deciding to have a baby solely on the basis of revelation will 
lack depth, then it is unlikely that this worry will dissipate if other reasons are included but 
are given very little weight compared to revelation. Even choosing primarily, but not 
exclusively, on the basis of revelation might be questionable when deliberating about TEs 
such as career changes and parenthood. The worry is that for many TEs, choosing to undergo 
them for the sake of revelation is going to look like the wrong kind of reason to base one’s 
decision on. This is especially the case with transformative choices that have important 
ethical dimensions to them, as I will explain in the next section. 
                                                 
12  Admittedly, this assumes that people have the material and educational resources, as well as the requisite 
talents, to choose a career based on what they most value and enjoy. Many people’s work choices are 
dictated by economic necessity and social circumstance. My discussion here concerns what is normatively 
desirable, free from practical constraints. 
20 
 
 
 
Justifying one’s choice: the ethics of self-transformation 
 
I have argued that Paul’s revelation argument cannot provide a complete solution to the 
problem of TEs. It must be bolstered with an account of decision-making grounded in one’s 
practical identity. In addition, choosing to undergo a TE on the basis of revelation can, at 
times, be challenged on ethical grounds. To see why, consider the decision to have a child. 
Recall that, on Paul’s account, ‘if you choose to have a child, your choice is to discover the 
new experiences and new preferences of a parent, whatever they will be’ (Paul, 2014, p. 119). 
Recall also that Paul’s account is normative: it is about how one ought to deliberate (Paul, 
2014, p. 20). Her argument, then, is that, if one wants to choose to have a child (or to undergo 
some other TE) using the standard model of subjective rational deliberation, which is 
grounded in imagining what the future experience will be like, then one can only and should 
only do so on the basis of revelation. Thus, the revelation approach is offered by Paul as an 
important way, perhaps even the main way, to make major life-choices. 
 
However, if one were to ask an expectant mother why she became pregnant (assuming it was 
done voluntarily), then I do not think that we should be satisfied if her response is, “I wanted 
to discover what it would be like to be a parent”. If her answer is to be ethically acceptable, 
then we require her to make some reference to the belief that she would make a good parent, 
that she wanted to care for and to love a human being, that she was in a suitable position to 
do so (e.g. has sufficient financial resources) and/or that it was something that her partner 
21 
 
also wanted.13 Similarly, one should not choose to get married or move in with one’s partner 
purely for the sake of revelation. Rather, one should do so because one is in love or for some 
such suitable, other-regarding reason. If one’s partner asked, “why did you marry me?” or 
“why did you agree to move in with me?”, then responding with “to find out what it would be 
like” is not the kind of justification that would, or should, be acceptable to them.14 There is 
nothing wrong with revelation playing a part in one’s deliberative process about decisions 
such as these. Someone may be genuinely curious to know what being a parent or moving in 
with a partner will be like. However, this consideration should have at most a relatively small 
role in their decision-making. 
 
Shupe objects that Paul’s solution is problematic when applied to cases involving decisions 
that primarily affect another person (Shupe, 2016). She discusses Paul’s own example of 
choosing to give a cochlear implant to one’s child. On Paul’s revelation approach, the way to 
decide rationally whether or not to give one’s child a cochlear implant is to determine what 
the value of revelation has for you. This, Shupe complains, overlooks the fact that what is of 
primary importance in this decision is what it will be like for the child to have the implant.15 
Paul’s solution fails to treat the child’s outcome as the most relevant one to the decision 
process. However, Shupe suggests that the majority of Paul’s other cases, such as choosing to 
have a child and changing career, are immune from this worry. This is because in such cases 
the main person affected by the decision is the person making it and hence the question of 
                                                 
13  This remains true even if the effect on her of having the child transforms her in a way that makes her a poor 
mother (such as if she suffered from very severe postnatal depression). We still want her to have acted for 
ethically acceptable reasons at the time of deliberation. 
14  The same point is made by Chan (2016, p. 285). However, the topic of Chan’s discussion, and the 
conclusions drawn, are very different to this paper’s. 
15 For a discussion of the decision to transform others, see Howard (2015) 
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what value revelation has for them is appropriate. Hence, Shupe seems to allow that one can 
adopt Paul’s solution when deliberating about changing oneself. 
 
I agree that the revelation approach is inappropriate for choosing to give one’s child a 
cochlear implant. However, unlike Schupe, I also worry that it is inappropriate for many of 
Paul’s other central examples, at least if it is the sole or main consideration that guides one’s 
decision. One reason for this is because changing oneself often has a significant effect on 
people one cares about. One’s decision to have a child impacts other people, not just the 
future child but also one’s partner and existing family. Thus, when deciding to procreate, it 
matters why one chooses to do so (Lotz, 2011). We may want to be able to justify our choice 
to our child when it is older and one’s partner and family may reasonably expect us to be able 
to offer ethically-acceptable, other-regarding reasons for choosing to have a child (and I have 
listed such reasons above). I am suggesting that “to find out what it was like” is not such a 
reason. 
 
This claim applies to other TEs, such as changing career, moving to a new country or 
changing one’s sex/gender. Basing these decisions solely, or even primarily, on the value of 
revelation ignores, or gives too little weight to, the commitments and obligations that 
underpin one’s loving relationships. Thus, the revelation approach, when taken in isolation as 
a sufficient method for deciding what to do, or when given much greater weighting than other 
relevant reasons, may provide a rational justification for choosing to have a TE at the cost of 
an ethically acceptable one. Importantly, focusing on one’s practical identity will help to 
avoid this problem. Deciding to marry someone because I love them, or to have a child 
because I value family life, reflects who I am and are the sorts of reasons I could offer to my 
partner and children – they are the sorts of reasons that would be acceptable to them. 
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It is useful to consider what has been said thus far in the light of Arvan’s response to Paul’s 
work.16 Arvan argues that, if Paul’s challenge stands, then the most rational way for people to 
approach TEs is to develop “resilience”, that is, ‘a general ability to navigate life 
psychologically, socially, culturally, and physically in ways that sustain their own personal 
well-being… to not be defeated by negative life events, and to deal with them in productive 
rather than unproductive ways’ (Arvan, 2015, pp. 1207–8). Thus, if one cannot know what an 
outcome will be like and how it will change one as a person, then one can at least develop the 
sort of personality that will respond positively to the outcome whatever it happens to be like. 
Being resilient will make it more likely that one will respond better to the outcome, and have 
a more positive experience of it, than someone who is non-resilient.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be problematic if one made one’s decision solely in order to develop 
resilience. One should not have a child or marry a partner because it will make one more 
resilient. (Again, imagine asking your partner to marry you so you can increase your 
resilience). As with revelation, resilience should not be the only basis on which a first-
personal decision is made. It is relevant to one’s decision making, but should not be taken as 
a motivational reason. Rather, one’s being resilient will help one to realise one’s existing, 
appropriate practical reasons. Indeed, it will often increase the robustness or effectiveness of 
the reasons one’s endorsed identity provides.  
 
To see why, imagine that Mary is deciding whether to have a child. She does not know what 
it will be like for her to experience parenthood, but she knows she loves her partner and 
values caring for others. Thus, she has good reasons to have a child. If Mary is also resilient, 
                                                 
16  I am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for several of the points that follow and for correcting my 
discussion of Arvan’s account. 
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then she is more likely to cope with the potential pressures, stresses and life-changes 
associated with parenthood. In turn, this is likely to ensure a better relationship with her 
partner, as she will be less stressed, exhausted or overwhelmed by parenthood. Being resilient 
will help to make Mary’s reasons effective / fulfilled. She will be able to “live up to” or 
“realise” her endorsed practical identity, that is, what she values and cares about. Thus, 
approaching TEs through the concept of resilience can fit well with the practical identity 
approach I have outlined. 
 
There is one final observation to make about the role of revelation and resilience in one’s 
decision-making and their relationship to one’s practical identity.17 Sometimes, one may be 
deeply ambivalent about a decision and/or unclear about what choice would best reflect who 
one is. Perhaps one values family life and caring for others, but one also values travelling and 
spending time on one’s own. Thus, one may be genuinely uncertain about whether to have a 
child in the light of one’s practical identity. One feels deeply torn between one’s various 
values, projects and commitments, which give good reasons both for and against parenthood. 
In such a scenario, one may appeal to revelation and/or resilience as a “decider” or “tie-
breaker”. If one values having novel experiences, or if one knows that one is very resilient 
and often makes the best of things, then one may use this knowledge to resolve one’s 
uncertainty. Although having a child purely or primarily for the sake of revelation or 
developing resilience are not good reasons, revelation and resilience could be good reasons 
for choosing between two options that are both well supported by one’s values, 
commitments, projects and the like. 
 
 
                                                 
17 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue. 
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Conclusion 
 
We are often faced with significant life choices that will change who we are. Many of these 
choices will be personally and epistemically transformative: before making them, we cannot 
what they will be like for us to experience and how they will alter us. Paul argues that, if we 
want to decide to undergo a TE based on its subjective experiential value, then we can only 
do so on the basis of revelation. I have argued that (a) revelation should not the means by 
which we make a transformative choice; (b) for many TEs, revelation should play little or no 
role in our decision-making. This applies even when we are deliberating first-personally. We 
should often base our decisions primarily on what those features of our practical identity that 
we endorse commit us to; we should base our decisions on what we value and care about.  
 
Rather than refute Paul’s solution, I have argued that it can only form part of a complete 
account of decision-making about TEs. Thus, I have tried to show that such deliberation is 
complex, more complex than much current discussion of TEs and rational deliberation makes 
out, and involves balancing a variety of different reasons. What this means is that deciding to 
undergo a TE should involve more than the value of revelation. It should also include reasons 
relating to our practical identity and our ethical relationships with others. The value of 
revelation can be invoked when making a decision, but it is important to appreciate its 
appropriate weighting in relation to other relevant reasons. 
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